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COURT-ORDERED CONFIDENTIALITY IN DISCOVERY
HOWARD M. ERICHSON*
INTRODUCTION
Some version of the following exchange happens regularly in state
and federal courts around the United States. A party seeks discovery; the
request includes a demand for documents or other information that the
responding party considers sensitive. The responding party agrees to turn
over the documents or other information only if given an assurance of con-
fidentiality. The lawyers hammer out a confidentiality agreement that both
sides find acceptable, and they present it to the judge as a stipulated protec-
tive order. The setup is so commonplace that it would be easy to miss the
following question, which is not an easy one. Should the court grant the
protective order based solely on the parties' stipulation, or should the court
require some showing that confidentiality is warranted? If the latter, how
strong a showing should the court demand? Some judges simply sign the
stipulated order with no questions asked.' Others require a showing of good
cause, the level of rigor of which may vary.2 Some lawyers complain that
courts have become increasingly hostile to stipulated protective orders. 3
* Professor of Law, Seton Hall Law School. I thank all of the participants in the AALS Civil
Procedure Section 2005 annual meeting program on Secrecy in Litigation. Although I chair the Protec-
tive Order Subcommittee of the New Jersey Supreme Court Civil Practice Committee, this Article
reflects solely my individual views, not those of the subcommittee or committee.
1. See Estate of Frankl v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 853 A.2d 880, 882 (N.J. 2004) ("With-
out making any findings, a trial court signed the [stipulated] Protective Order."). See also Pansy v.
Borough of Stroudsburg, 23 F.3d 772, 785 (3d Cir. 1994) ("Disturbingly, some courts routinely sign
orders which contain confidentiality clauses without considering the propriety of such orders, or the
countervailing public interests which are sacrificed by the orders."); Advanced Modular Sputtering, Inc.
v. Superior Court, 33 Cal. Rptr. 3d 901, 904 n.2 (Ct. App. 2005) (noting that "the parties stipulated to
the entry of another protective order pursuant to which many of their documents are treated as confiden-
tial and filed under seal"); In re Shell E & P, Inc., No. 04-05-00345-CV, 2005 WL 2085337, at * I (Tex.
App. Aug. 31, 2005) (allowing a non-party standing to enforce "an 'Unopposed Protective Order Re-
garding Confidentiality' ... which was signed by [the court in a prior lawsuit]"); Bd. of Trustees of Cal.
State Univ. v. Superior Court, 34 Cal. Rptr. 3d 82, 90 (Ct. App. 2005) (suggesting that if parties wish to
keep certain litigation documents confidential, "the parties could agree on a protective order as to such
documents at the outset of the litigation").
2. See Foltz v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 331 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2003); Glenmede
Trust Co. v. Thompson, 56 F.3d 476, 483 (3d Cir. 1995); Jepson, Inc. v. Makita Elec. Works, Ltd., 30
F.3d 854, 858 (7th Cir. 1994). See also Jordana Cooper, Beyond Judicial Discretion: Toward a Rights-
Based Theory of Civil Discovery and Protective Orders, 36 RUTGERs L.J. 775, 782 (2005) ("Even in
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The debate over discovery confidentiality has raged for over twenty
years, 4 since before the Supreme Court's decision in Seattle Times Co. v.
Rhinehart,5 and it shows no sign of fading. If anything, issues of litigation
confidentiality appear to have gained increased attention in recent years.
The United States District Court for the District of South Carolina attracted
nationwide attention in 2002 when it adopted a local rule severely restrict-
ing secret settlements and addressing other aspects of court-ordered confi-
dentiality.6 In 2004 the Federal Judicial Center completed an empirical
study of sealed settlements. 7 It seems that each month of 2005 brought new
attention to this set of issues. In January, the Civil Procedure Section of the
Association of American Law Schools presented a program on "Secrecy in
Litigation."'8 In February, the federal judges for the District of New Jersey
adopted a local rule imposing restrictions on discovery protective orders as
well as sealed settlements.9 In March, the Supreme Court decided Ballard
v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue,10 involving the secrecy of Tax Court
cases where the parties stipulate to the terms of a protective order, it is of little moment without a true
satisfaction of this rigorous 'good cause' standard because the Court is charged with independently
testing the protective order under Rule 26(c).").
3. See Jack E. Pace III, Testing the Security Blanket: An Analysis of Recent Challenges to Stipu-
lated Blanket Protective Orders, ANTITRUST, Summer 2005 at 46, 46.
Even where both parties agree to limitations on the use of their opponent's confidential in-
formation-and there is no live dispute before the court concerning the use of that informa-
tion--courts increasingly are rejecting SPOs [Stipulated Protective Orders]. These rejections
usually occur in unpublished orders or during discovery status conferences and are not re-
ported in published decisions. But a growing body of case law, commentary, and anecdotal
evidence indicates a marked and growing trend in this direction.
Id. Pace, an antitrust lawyer, writes that in the past two years he was involved on three occasions in
cases in which courts refused to sign stipulated protective orders. Id. at n.5.
4. See, e.g., Richard L. Marcus, Myth and Reality in Protective Order Litigation, 69 CORNELL L.
REv. 1 (1983).
5. 467 U.S. 20 (1984).
6. D.S.C. LOCAL R. 5.03. See Joseph F. Anderson, Jr., Hidden from the Public by Order of the
Court: The Case Against Government-Enforced Secrecy, 55 S.C. L. REv. 711, 719-26 (2004) (describ-
ing the adoption of the District of South Carolina local rule).
7. See R. TIMOTHY REAGAN ET AL., FED. JUDICIAL CTR., SEALED SETTLEMENT AGREEMENTS IN
FEDERAL DISTRICT COURT 1 (2004), available at
http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/SealSet3.pdf/Sfile/SealSet3.pdf.
8. The words "secrecy" and "confidentiality" in this context are both loaded terms. Whereas
secrecy tends to connote something dangerous or dirty, confidentiality, especially among lawyers,
connotes an ethical duty. Those who favor greater openness in litigation tend to describe their opposi-
tion to "secrecy," while those who place less weight on openness describe their support of "confidenti-
ality." Compare, e.g., Anderson, supra note 6, at 711, with Richard L. Marcus, The Discovery
Confidentiality Controversy, 1991 U. ILL. L. REv. 457 (1991). 1 moderated the 2005 AALS panel and
chose the title "Secrecy in Litigation" because the panel was designed around the anti-secrecy argu-
ments and responses to them. In this Article, however, I refer to the issue as one of confidentiality,
consistent with the Article's central theme that, given the breadth of modern United States discovery,
courts in most cases should grant confidentiality orders on a relatively light showing.
9. See D.N.J. LOCAL R. 5.3 (adopted Feb. 24, 2005).
10. 125 S. Ct. 1270 (2005).
[Vol 81:357
HeinOnline  -- 81 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 358 2006
COURT-ORDERED CONFIDENTIALITY IN DISCOVERY
trial judge findings. And in April, The Sedona Conference Working Group
on Protective Orders, Confidentiality and Public Access published a draft
set of guidelines ("Sedona Guidelines") on protective orders and litigation
confidentiality. " I
When parties present a court with a stipulated protective order, it is
easy to understand why many judges would be quick to sign it. Such a pro-
tective order addressing discovery confidentiality lubricates the wheels of
discovery. With a protective order in place, a responding party is more
willing to turn over information rather than asserting and litigating every
plausible relevance objection and privilege objection. After all, neither
party objects to the order. On the other hand, litigation is a public process.
Court-ordered confidentiality may prevent the public from gaining access
to information that bears on public health and safety. Confidentiality may
also decrease the efficiency of litigation by obstructing information-sharing
among lawyers. Finally, there is a nagging sense that the imprimatur of the
court ought not to be given without at least some showing of good cause.
This Article offers support for the argument that protective orders for
discovery confidentiality should be granted upon a relatively light showing
of good cause. The Article proceeds in two parts. Part I offers reasons why,
in the vast majority of cases, courts should readily grant motions for protec-
tive orders with respect to discovery confidentiality as long as the movant
can articulate some legitimate need for the information to be kept confiden-
tial. Looking at modem United States discovery from a comparative and
historical perspective, broad and powerful party-controlled discovery can
only be justified as a means of finding information for the resolution of the
dispute, not as a public information tool. Part II explains why some show-
ing of good cause nonetheless should be required, even if the parties them-
selves agree to the confidentiality protections.
I. A LIGHT STANDARD OF GOOD CAUSE FOR DISCOVERY
CONFIDENTIALITY
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c) permits a court to grant a pro-
tective order "for good cause shown." 12 What constitutes good cause, how-
ever, necessarily depends on the extent to which courts have reason to
11. The Sedona Conference Working Group on Protective Orders, Confidentiality & Public
Access, The Sedona Guidelines: Best Practices Addressing Protective Orders, Confidentiality & Public
Access in Civil Cases, 6 SEDONA CONF. J. 183 (2005) [hereinafter Sedona Guidelines], available at
http://www.abanet.org/litigation/abaannual/papers/06b.pdf (April 2005 Revised Public Comment Draft
Version).
12. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c). See also, e.g., N.J. R. CT. 4:10-3 (similarly permitting a court to grant a
protective order "for good cause shown").
2006]
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resist granting the requested order. Regarding protective orders forbidding
certain discovery or otherwise limiting parties' access to information,
courts appropriately require a showing that the information sought is not
properly discoverable or that the discovery would cause an undue burden.1 3
The question is whether protective orders that do not limit discovery of
information, but rather restrict the disclosure of that information beyond the
litigation, should require a similarly robust showing of good cause.
The recent draft Sedona Guidelines wisely recommend an easily satis-
fied threshold for obtaining confidentiality protective orders: "[T]he good
cause standard generally should be considered to be satisfied as long as the
parties can articulate a legitimate need for privacy or confidentiality, in
those instances where the protective order will apply only to the disclosure
of information exchanged during discovery.' 14
The Guidelines go on to emphasize that the good cause standard for a
confidentiality protective order covering unfiled discovery does not require
a detailed showing:
Because of the limited scope and provisional nature of the protective or-
der, the court need not conduct a detailed evidentiary inquiry into the na-
ture of the information at issue, which courts are sometimes unwilling or
often practically unable to do, where much or all of the information at is-
sue may not ever be used in connection with the determination of the
merits of the dispute.15
This approach makes sense. A light standard of good cause for dis-
covery confidentiality reduces the burden on the court and facilitates the
parties' information-gathering without impairing the public's ability to
monitor the adjudicatory process.
Some courts require a more rigorous good cause showing before
granting a protective order for discovery confidentiality. In the Third Cir-
cuit, such a protective order may not be granted unless the proponent shows
that disclosure would cause a "clearly defined and serious injury,"'16 and
13. Cf FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c).
14. Sedona Guidelines, supra note 11, at 201-02.
15. Id. at 202.
16. Pansy v. Borough of Stroudsburg, 23 F.3d 772, 786 (3d Cir. 1994). The Third Circuit adheres
to the following seven-factor test for deciding whether to grant a confidentiality protective order:
1) whether disclosure will violate any privacy interests;
2) whether the information is being sought for a legitimate purpose or for an improper pur-
pose;
3) whether disclosure of the information will cause a party embarrassment;
4) whether confidentiality is being sought over information important to public health and
safety;
5) whether the sharing of information among litigants will promote fairness and efficiency;
6) whether a party benefiting from the order of confidentiality is a public entity or official;
and
[Vol 81:357
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the need for the protective order must be shown with specificity. 17 One
practice guide on federal discovery proceedings advises attorneys that "[a]
party seeking an order prohibiting disclosure of information obtained
through discovery must show good cause. There must be evidence that
disclosure would work a clearly defined and serious injury. The motion
should be supported by facts, rather than conclusory statements, to demon-
strate injury.' 18
Requiring evidence that disclosure would cause a "clearly defined and
serious injury" imposes too great a burden on those seeking confidentiality
protection. Such a strict requirement would make sense only if there were a
strong presumption in favor of public access to discovery. Resistance to
confidentiality orders comes from a sense that the machinery of justice
should be accessible to the public. Litigation is a public process, the argu-
ment goes, and public monitoring of the justice system requires that non-
parties have access to the information that drives adjudication. But discov-
ery is not adjudication, and the presumption of public access that applies to
the adjudicatory process should not apply equally to discovery.
It is important, in this regard, to distinguish between filed and unfiled
discovery. A presumption of public access attaches to the adjudicatory
process itself. Thus, for example, public access to the courtroom during
trials should not be blocked except for very good reason. 19 Likewise, plead-
ings and dispositive motions are public records that should not be sealed
except under compelling circumstances. 20 When materials obtained in dis-
covery are introduced as evidence, either at trial or as attachments to a mo-
tion for summary judgment or other merits-related motion, 21 they become
part of the adjudicatory process, and should be treated much like pleadings
7) whether the case involves issues important to the public.
Shingara v. Skiles, 420 F.3d 301, 306 (3d Cir. 2005) (citing Glenmede Trust Co. v. Thompson, 56 F.3d
476, 483 (3d Cir. 1995)).
17. Pansy, 23 F.3d at 786. See also Shingara, 420 F.3d at 306 ("In Pansy we explained that there
is good cause when a party shows that disclosure will result in a clearly defined, specific and serious
injury but that broad allegations of harm are not sufficient to establish good cause.").
18. 2 DISCOVERY PROCEEDINGS N FEDERAL COURT § 20.13, at 24-25 (3d ed. 1995).
19. See Sedona Guidelines, supra note 11, at 25 ("Public access to trials on the merits, both jury
and nonjury, reflects a long tradition in the United States. Trials have long been considered open to the
public. Public access to trials is essential to the monitoring and oversight of the judicial process.").
20. See, e.g., In re Cendant Corp., 260 F.3d 183, 192-93 (3d Cir. 2001); see also N.J. R. CT. 1:38
("All records which are required by statute or rule to be made, maintained or kept on file by any
court... shall be deemed a public record and shall be available for public inspection and copying
[except for certain categories of confidential documents such as personnel records and probation re-
ports].").
21. Materials filed as attachments to a discovery motion, however, ordinarily should be treated the
same as unfiled discovery. See, e.g., Hammock v. Hoffmann-LaRoche, Inc., 662 A.2d 546, 558 (N.J.
1995) ("[T]here is no presumptive right-of-public-access to discovery motions filed with the trial
court.").
2006]
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and courtroom proceedings, accessible to the public unless there is a com-
pelling reason to the contrary.22 The recent Sedona Guidelines state this
point as a fundamental principle: "The public has a qualified right of access
to pleadings, motions, and any other papers submitted to a court on matters
that affect the merits of a controversy that can only be overcome in compel-
ling circumstances. '23 Unfiled discovery, 24 on the other hand, does not give
rise to a presumption of public access. 25 As the Sedona Guidelines put it,
"[t]here is no presumed right of the public to participate in the discovery
process or to have access to the fruits of discovery that are not submitted to
the court." 26 Public monitoring of the judicial system does not require ac-
cess to materials that are exchanged during discovery but not submitted for
use in adjudication.
A. Modern United States Discovery in Comparative and Historical Per-
spective
From both a comparative and historical perspective, the breadth of
modem United States discovery is staggering. Under the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, as well as under state rules with comparable provisions,
"[p]arties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, that is
relevant to the claim or defense of any party. ' 27 The Rule assumes that one
piece of information may lead to another: "Relevant information need not
22. See id. at 558-59 (recognizing a strong presumption in favor of public access to documents
filed as motion attachments).
23. Sedona Guidelines, supra note 11, at 188. The commentary explains:
A qualified right or presumption of public access attaches to all documents filed with thecourt and material to the adjudication of all non-discovery matters. To overcome the pre-
sumption, the proponent of any motion to seal documents or court proceedings to which thepresumption attaches must demonstrate that there are compelling reasons for denying public
access and no reasonable alternative.
Id. (citation omitted).
24. Under the Federal Rules, parties must file pleadings, motions, and other papers, but do not file
disclosures, depositions, interrogatories, document requests, or requests for admission unless they are
used in the proceeding. See FED. R. Ctv. P. 5(d); see also Estate of Frankl v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber
Co., 853 A.2d 880, 886-87 (N.J. 2004) ("Furthermore, the 2000 Amendment to Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(d),
setting forth that discovery must not be filed unless it is 'used in the proceeding,' bolsters the distinction
between filed and unfiled documents and supports the conclusion that unfiled discovery is not meant to
be accessible to non-parties.").
25. See, e.g., In re GlaxoSmithKline PLC, 699 N.W.2d 749, 755 (Minn. 2005) ("[D]ocuments
produced as discovery are not presumed to be public."). Thus, in Hammock, while finding a presump-
tion of public access to documents filed in connection with civil litigation, the New Jersey Supreme
Court emphasized that "[t]he standard we establish today recognizes that there must continue to be
confidentiality of materials submitted in the discovery process." 662 A.2d at 558.
26. Sedona Guidelines, supra note 11, at 200.
27. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b). Even broader discovery is obtainable by court order upon a showing of
good cause: "discovery of any matter relevant to the subject matter involved in the action." FED. R. Civ.
P. 26(b).
[Vol 81:357
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be admissible at the trial if the discovery appears reasonably calculated to
lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. '28 Although the scope of
discovery under this Federal Rule was narrowed slightly by the 2000
amendments to Rule 26,29 it remains extraordinarily broad. Not only do the
Rules establish a broad scope of discoverable information, they provide a
kit full of powerful tools for extracting that information: interrogatories, 30
written and oral depositions,31 inspection of documents, things, and land,32
physical and mental examinations, 33 and requests to admit.34 Depositions
and documents can be obtained from non-parties as well as parties. 35 Those
who fail to comply with discovery requests may be ordered to do SO, 3 6 and
failure to comply with an order compelling discovery may subject the per-
son to sanctions. 37 All in all, Federal Rules 26 through 37, and comparable
rules in many states, give litigants extraordinary power to force others to
turn over information against their will.
From a comparative perspective, United States discovery is unique. As
Linda Mullenix puts it, "no other country in the world has any system of
discovery approaching that provided for in the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure. ' '38 Neither civil law countries nor other common law countries give
parties such power to demand information. The approach in most civil law
countries is summarized by the American Law Institute and UNIDROIT 39
in the introduction to their proposed Principles and Rules of Transnational
Civil Procedure:
Under the civil law there is no discovery as such. However, a party has a
right to request the court to interrogate a witness or to require the oppos-
ing party to produce a document. This arrangement is a corollary of the
general principle in the civil-law system that the court rather than the
parties is in charge of the development of evidence. In some civil-law
systems a party cannot be compelled to produce a document that will es-
28. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b).
29. Before 2000, Rule 26(b) permitted discovery of "any matter, not privileged, which is relevant
to the subject matter involved in the pending action." STEPHEN C. YEAZELL, FEDERAL RULES OF CtvtL
PROCEDURE 66, 69 (1999).
30. FED. R. Civ. P. 33.
31. FED. R. Civ. P. 30; FED. R. CIv. P. 31.
32. FED. R. Civ. P. 34.
33. FED. R. CIV. P. 35.
34. FED. R. Civ. P. 36.
35. FED. R. CIV. P. 30(a)(1); FED. R. Civ. P. 34(c).
36. FED. R. Civ. P. 37.
37. FED. R. Civ. P. 37.
38. Linda S. Mullenix, Lessons from Abroad: Complexity and Convergence, 46 VILL. L. REV. 1, 6
(2001).
39. UNIDROIT is the International Institute for the Unification of Private Law, an organization
with approximately fifty member countries.
2006]
HeinOnline  -- 81 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 363 2006
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
tablish its own liability-something like a civil equivalent of a privilege
against self-incrimination. However, in many civil-law systems a party
may be compelled to produce a document when the judge concludes that
the document is the only evidence concerning the point on issue.... In
any event, the standard for production under the civil law appears uni-
formly to be "relevance" in a fairly strict sense. 40
Stephen Subrin, in his provocatively titled article, Discovery in Com-
parative Perspective: Are We Nuts?, emphasizes the difference in the
amount of lawyer control: "Lawyers in civil law countries do not conduct
pretrial depositions. There is also no pretrial document production con-
ducted by the lawyers."'4 1
Even in other common law countries, such as the United Kingdom and
Canada, U.S.-style discovery is largely unknown:
In most common-law jurisdictions, pretrial depositions are unusual and,
in some countries, typically are employed only when the witness will be
unavailable for trial. Documents are subject to discovery only when rele-
vant to the proceeding. Relevance for this purpose is defined by refer-
ence to the pleadings in the case and.., the rules of pleading require full
specification of claims and defenses. 42
In England, for example, parties may apply to the court for permission to
take an oral deposition in limited situations, such as when a witness will be
unavailable for trial.4 3
Professor Subrin acknowledges areas of convergence in light of the
fact that England, Japan, the Netherlands, and other countries have adopted
procedures that somewhat increase parties' ability to gather information, 44
but ultimately there is no denying the disparity between discovery in the
United States and elsewhere:
[T]he number of discovery mechanisms available to the American law-
yer as a matter of right, the degree of party control over discovery, the
extent to which liberal discovery in the United States has become what
40. AM. LAW INST., ALIUNIDROIT PRINCIPLES AND RULES OF TRANSNATIONAL CIVIL
PROCEDURE 12-13 (2004) (proposed final draft of March 9, 2004), available at
http://www.unidroit.orglenglis/principles/civilprocedure/aii-unidroitprinciples-e.pdf
41. Stephen N. Subrin, Discovery in Global Perspective: Are We Nuts?, 52 DEPAUL L. REV. 299,
302 (2002).
42. AM. LAW INST., supra note 40, at 11.
43. See Subrin, supra note 41, at 305. Canadian depositions ("examinations for discovery") are
more limited than those in the United States. Parties have a right to examine only each individual party
and one representative of each corporate party; there is no right to depose non-parties without leave of
court. Id. at 306 n.34.
44. See id. at 302-03 (describing Japan's 1998 procedural reforms); id. at 303-04 (describing
England's 1999 procedural reforms); id. at 306 & n.35 (describing the Netherlands' 1988 procedural
reforms). See also Mullenix, supra note 38, at 24-26 (suggesting that there has been some convergence
in discovery); see generally KuO-CHANG HUANG, INTRODUCING DISCOVERY INTO CIVIL LAW (2003)
(advocating incorporation of more discovery procedures into civil law systems).
[Vol 81:357
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almost looks like a constitutional right, and the massive use of discovery
of all kinds in a substantial number of cases surely sets us apart.45
What is extraordinary about United States discovery from a compara-
tive perspective is not only its breadth, but also the extent to which it is
controlled by the parties rather than by the court. In spite of this, the court
may become involved in discovery in several ways. Under the Federal
Rules, certain aspects of discovery require the court's approval, such as
physical and mental examinations. 46 Parties may solicit the court's in-
volvement by moving to compel, seeking a protective order, or requesting
sanctions.47 In complex cases, courts sometimes appoint special masters to
oversee discovery. 48 On the whole, however, the discovery Rules are de-
signed to minimize the court's role and to enable the parties to control the
process. By contrast, even in other common law countries where lawyers
develop the evidence, the lawyers' power is significantly circumscribed by
judicial control.49 In civil law countries, the court possesses primary con-
trol over evidence-gathering. 50
Looking at modem United States discovery from an historical per-
spective highlights the same two features: its breadth and the extent of
party control. At common law, which depended on pleadings and trial to
bring out the information relevant to adjudication, discovery played little
role.5 1 Rather, the antecedents of modem discovery devices may be found
45. Subrin, supra note 41, at 306-07.
46. See FED. R. CIv. P. 35. See also Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b) (requiring court order for discovery of
matters "relevant to the subject matter" but not "relevant to the claim or defense of any party").
47. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26; FED. R. CIV. P. 37.
48. MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH), § 11.424 (2004).
49. See Subrin, supra note 41, at 305 (noting that in England, if the court gives permission to take
an oral deposition, the court decides whether a judge, an examiner of the court, or a person appointed by
the court will preside over the deposition).
50. See RUDOLF B. SCHLESINGER ET AL., COMPARATIVE LAW 469 (6th ed. 1998) (explaining the
rule against taking depositions in many civil law countries in terms of "their fundamental notion that the
taking of evidence in a lawsuit is not a private matter, but a function of the state, i.e., a function that
may be performed only by judges or other officials deriving their authority from the local sovereign");
MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, supra note 48, at § 11.494.
Discovery directed at witnesses, documents, or other evidence located outside the United
States will often create problems, since many countries view American pretrial discovery as
inconsistent with or contrary to their laws, customs, and national interests. For example, in
civil-law jurisdictions where courts control the gathering and presentation of evidence, taking
a deposition may be viewed as a judicial act performed by another sovereign.
Id.
51. Stephen Subrin explains the reasons for discovery's insignificance in both the early and later
periods of common law:
Historically, discovery had been extremely limited in both England and the United States. At
early common law, the litigation process was looked at not as a rational quest for truth, but
rather a method by which society could determine which side God took to be truthful or just.
Discovery did not make sense in a world of ordeal, battle and oath-takers. Initially, the jurors
themselves were people in the community who had knowledge of the facts. Nor was there
much need for discovery at the later period of the common law when the pleadings assumed
2006]
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in equity, where information could be obtained through interrogatories and
depositions. These information-gathering devices, however, served a rather
different function from modem discovery. As one treatise describes it,
"Discovery in equity was not a truly pretrial device, as we use that term
today, but a trial on the basis of documentary evidence. ' '52 Also, equitable
discovery was subject to significant limitations.53 Despite statutory proce-
dures for interrogatories, document production, and depositions, discovery
under code procedure was likewise quite limited.54 The discovery provi-
sions of the Federal Rules, enacted in 1938, represented a dramatic depar-
ture. 55
B. Confidentiality and the Purpose of Discovery
When viewed in comparative and historical perspective, the breadth of
modem United States discovery is extraordinary, as is the extent of party
control over these powerful tools. Given the breadth of discovery and the
power it places in the hands of the adversary parties, the argument for pub-
lic access is weaker than it would be if discovery were narrower or less
party-driven. The only sufficient justification for the modem United States
version of discovery is to allow parties to gain access to information
needed for the just resolution of disputes, not to make information accessi-
ble to the public. "Liberal discovery," the Supreme Court declared in Seat-
tle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, "is provided for the sole purpose of assisting in
the preparation and trial, or the settlement, of litigated disputes."'56 The
standard for obtaining an order protecting the confidentiality of unfiled
such a critical role. The major purpose of single issue pleading was to reduce the case to a
demurred issue that could be decided legally or to a limited question of fact.
Stephen N. Subrin, Fishing Expeditions Allowed: The Historical Background of the 1938 Federal
Discovery Rules, 39 B.C. L. REV. 691, 694-95 (1998) (footnotes omitted).
52. FLEMING JAMES, JR. ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE 284 (5th ed. 2001).
53. See id. at 285 (noting, among other limitations, that discovery could be had only against the
adverse party, could reach only evidence that would be admissible at trial, and could obtain only infor-
mation relevant to the case of the party seeking discovery (as opposed to information relevant to the
adversary's case)); Subrin, supra note 51, at 698-99 (describing the limitations on equitable discovery
and noting that before the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure "extremely limited discovery took place in
both law and equity cases in the federal courts").
54. See JAMES ET AL., supra note 52, at 286. The Field Code permitted depositions of the oppos-
ing party, but the deposition took the place of calling the witness at trial, and it was conducted before a
judge. See Subrin, supra note 51, at 696.
55. See Subrin, supra note 51, at 691 ("The Federal Rules discovery provisions dramatically
increased the potential for discovery."). The broad discovery provisions went hand-in-hand with the
notice pleading rule. Parties were not expected to know the detailed facts at the outset, but were permit-
ted to discover them. Moreover, the pleadings could not serve as adequate disclosure mechanisms, so
discovery devices were needed to permit parties to investigate the facts. Id. at 711 (quoting Charles
Clark on the relationship between pleadings and discovery).
56. 467 U.S. 20, 34(1984).
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discovery therefore ought to be rather easy to satisfy in the ordinary run of
cases.
In civil law systems, to a far greater extent than in the United States,
the gathering of information coincides with its presentation to the court.57
Similarly, under equity practice prior to the advent of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, information-gathering through interrogatories and deposi-
tions was for the purpose of presentation to the chancellor. 58 In modem
United States discovery, by contrast, the primary information-gathering
process does not coincide with the presentation of evidence to the court;
indeed, much of the information never makes its way to the court.
Given the breadth of discovery and the extent of party control over it,
the argument for public disclosure cannot overcome a legitimate need for
confidentiality. Richard Marcus's words in 1991 ring even more true fif-
teen years later: "In an era of constantly diminished privacy it is important
that we resist unnecessary efforts to curtail protections for confidential
information. In an era when litigants have difficulty obtaining decisions of
their cases, we should not rush to embrace a public information purpose for
discovery." 59
II. A NON-ZERO STANDARD OF GOOD CAUSE FOR DISCOVERY
CONFIDENTIALITY
Although the standard of good cause for obtaining a discovery confi-
dentiality order should be relatively light, it should be greater than zero. In
other words, the court should not rubber-stamp a proposed protective order
for discovery confidentiality, even if the parties have stipulated to it, with-
out at least the minimal showing of the good cause suggested in Part I.
Questions about rubber-stamped stipulated protective orders arose in a
case decided by the New Jersey Supreme Court in 2004. In Estate of
Frankl v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.,60 the plaintiffs in a tire tread sepa-
ration case agreed to confidentiality in order to obtain documents from the
defendant. "In March 2000, plaintiffs and Goodyear, by consent, entered
into a 'Proposed Stipulation and Protective Order Regarding Pre-Trial
Documents to be Produced by Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.' Without mak-
ing any findings, a trial court signed the Protective Order in July 2000. ' '61
57. See supra text accompanying notes 38-45.
58. See supra text accompanying note 52.
59. Marcus, supra note 8, at 506.
60. 853 A.2d 880, 882 (N.J. 2004).
61. Id.
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Subsequently, when an intervenor sought access to the documents, a
different judge of the trial court denied Goodyear's motion to enforce the
protective order, explaining that courts should not "rubber-stamp Consent
Orders containing blanket confidentiality provisions that are not accompa-
nied by extrinsic support demonstrating good cause for their approval. '62
The New Jersey Supreme Court ultimately rejected the intervenor's effort
to obtain access to the documents on the grounds that the rule on protective
orders "is not an independent source of entitlement to public access to dis-
covery documents, but only a procedural device by which documents, oth-
erwise accessible, can be protected .... -"63 In answering whether the
protective order rule provides "an independent source of entitlement" to
information, the court lost sight of the question of whether a protective
order should be granted or upheld without some showing of good cause.
Even if the protective order rule itself does not provide a right of public
access to information, parties may choose to disclose discovery materials to
others unless prevented from doing so by an enforceable confidentiality
agreement or by a valid protective order. 64 Thus, the lack of a public right
to demand access to unfiled discovery materials does not render meaning-
less a non-party's challenge to a protective order's validity.
Three reasons counsel in favor of requiring at least a minimal showing
of good cause before ordering confidentiality, notwithstanding the parties'
agreement to the proposed order. First, some stipulated protective orders
ought to be denied or modified because the public interest in access to the
information outweighs the need for confidentiality. This is particularly true
where public safety is at stake or where efficient handling of related cases
requires that other lawyers have access to the information. Second, a find-
ing of good cause gives parties at least a modest assurance that they can
proceed with discovery in reliance on the protective order. Finally, the
court's imprimatur should not be granted, and the power of contempt in-
voked, based on nothing more than the parties' private agreement.
A. Opportunity to Deny or Modify a Protective Order
Some confidentiality orders should be denied. In some cases, there
may be no legitimate need for confidentiality. More importantly, if infor-
62. Id. at 883. See also Anderson, supra note 6, at 715 ("In my view, courts too often rubber-
stamp confidentiality orders presented to them .... ").
63. Frankl, 853 A.2d at 885-86.
64. Sedona Guidelines, supra note 1I, at 201 ("A litigant has the right to disclose the fruits of
discovery to non-parties, absent an agreement between the parties or an order based on a showing of
good cause.") (citing Harris v. Amoco Prod. Co., 768 F.2d 669, 683-84 (5th Cir. 1985)).
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mation bears on public health or safety, then a court should balance the
need for confidentiality against the public interest in disclosure, and it
should deny the protective order if the protective order is unjustified under
the circumstances. 65 The requirement that a court grant a protective order
only upon finding good cause creates an opportunity for the court to con-
sider whether the information concerns risks to the public. The lack of ad-
versarial presentation, in the case of a stipulated protective order, renders
this opportunity less likely than in the case of an opposed protective order.
Of course, it remains possible for a court familiar with the litigation to
identify a public safety issue that warrants consideration before granting
the order.
Even if a party has articulated a legitimate need for confidentiality,
and the case involves no public interest that justifies outright denial of the
protective order, a court may consider modifying the order rather than
granting it in the form to which the parties stipulated. In particular, if the
protective order prohibits the parties from sharing information with other
lawyers handling related cases, the court should consider modifying the
order to permit such sharing.66 Coordination among counsel in related
cases not only promotes litigation efficiency, but also enhances the quality
of legal work and tends to level the field in asymmetrical multiparty litiga-
tion. 67 The requirement that a court grant a protective order only upon find-
ing good cause creates an opportunity for the court to consider the
worthiness of the proposed order, including consideration of whether the
order would unduly constrain the sharing of information that would be
useful in related cases. 68
65. See Shingara v. Skiles, 420 F.3d 301, 307-08 (3d Cir. 2005) (vacating protective order based
in part on "the fact that this case involves public officials and issues important to the public"); Sedona
Guidelines, supra note 11, at 201 ("In determining whether good cause exists to issue or uphold a
protective order under Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c), a court is required to balance the parties' asserted interest
in privacy or confidentiality against the public interest in disclosure of information of legitimate public
concern.").
66. Sedona Guidelines, supra note 11, at 22. ("In many cases, any legitimate interest in continued
secrecy can be accommodated by placing the collateral litigants under the use and non-disclosure
restrictions of the original protective order. Modification merely removes the impediment of the protec-
tive order in the collateral litigation.").
67. See Howard M. Erichson, Informal Aggregation: Procedural and Ethical Implications of
Coordination Among Counsel in Related Lawsuits, 50 DuKE L.J. 381, 388-408 (2000) (describing
coordination among counsel); id. at 458 (arguing that such coordination often promotes efficiency,
quality, and fairness).
68. The stipulated protective order at issue in Frankl permitted the plaintiffs to "disseminate
confidential materials to 'other attorneys with similar cases against Goodyear' provided that Goodyear
received proper notice of such disclosure and the recipients of the information agreed to the terms of the
Protective Order." 853 A.2d at 882.
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B. Reliance on Protective Orders
When a court enters a protective order stating that certain information
must be kept confidential, parties proceed with discovery in reliance on that
order. Sophisticated parties understand that the order may be modified or
vacated, but a certain amount of reliance is inevitable. Indeed, reliance on
the order is exactly what the parties and the court intend, at least to some
extent, because the point of the protective order is to facilitate the exchange
of information by giving the responding party an assurance of confidential-
ity.
Protective orders remain subject to subsequent challenge, however.69
Not only may protective orders be challenged by parties, but non-parties
may intervene to seek modification or rescission of a protective order.70
Even after the conclusion of an action, if a protective order remains in ef-
fect then it remains subject to challenge. The possibility of subsequent
modification, according to one commentator, may be "the most significant
vulnerability in current protective order practice."'71 One district court, in
rejecting a stipulated protective order, explained that approval of the
agreement "may furnish the parties with a false sense of protection that
they might innocently, but wrongly, rely upon when releasing informa-
tion."72 To the extent that parties provide discovery in reliance on protec-
tive orders, such orders ought not to be granted if they have little chance of
withstanding a subsequent challenge.
69. See Cooper, supra note 2, at 783 ("[T]he decision whether to modify a protective order, even
long after trial or settlement, ultimately is a matter for the trial court's discretion. Thus, settled expecta-
tions may become unsettled at any point, even years after resolution of the case."). See also, e.g., Shin-
gara, 420 F.3d at 307-08 (permitting intervention by newspaper in public employee's action, and
vacating protective order based on public importance of case and failure to show harm with sufficient
specificity).
70. Sedona Guidelines, supra note 11, at 20. The Sedona Guidelines state:
Most courts that have considered the question hold that the media, public interest groups, and
other third-parties have standing to intervene in a civil case for the limited purposes of oppos-
ing or seeking modification or rescission of a protective order entered pursuant to Fed. Rule
Civ. P. 26(c) when they assert that the public interest is served by disclosure.
Id.
71. Cooper, supra note 2, at 782.
72. USA Techs., Inc. v. Alphanet Hospitality Sys., Inc., No. CIV.A.98-3027, 1999 WL 391472, at
*3 (E.D. Pa. May 26, 1999) (quoting Frupac Int'l Corp. v. MV "CHUCABUCO", No. CIV.A.92-2617,
1994 WL 269271, at *2 (E.D. Pa. June 15, 1994)).
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C. The Court's Imprimatur and the Power of Contempt
Parties are free to enter into discovery confidentiality agreements, 73
and often do so. Such agreements generally may be enforced as a matter of
contract law. Lawyers and litigants, however, often are unsatisfied with an
agreement in the absence of a court order. The protective order adds two
things to the parties' confidentiality agreement: the power of contempt, and
whatever symbolic power the court's imprimatur carries. One who
breaches a contract risks being sued in a breach of contract action. One
who violates a court order, however, is subject to contempt. Greater gov-
ernment power is brought to bear on the latter because it is not merely
about private agreement, but about the functioning of the judicial process
or other public values. As long as the court has found some legitimate rea-
son for confidentiality in discovery, a court order appropriately brings the
public power into play. But it is difficult to see why the power of contempt
should be invoked to enforce a mere agreement of the parties absent some
judicial determination favoring enforcement of the agreement.
The court's imprimatur, in other words, should not be granted solely
on the parties' say-so. 74 Parties should not have the power to turn their own
contracts into court orders, enforceable by the power of contempt. As stated
in Part I, orders protecting the confidentiality of unfiled discovery should
be granted on a relatively light showing. Whether or not the parties stipu-
late to the agreement, courts generally should grant such protective orders
as long as the proponent can show some legitimate need for confidentiality.
But the parties' agreement, without any showing of a need for confidential-
ity, should not suffice to invoke the authority of the court and the contempt
power. As Chief Judge Joseph Anderson puts it:
It is one thing to say that the parties have the right, as they do, to agree
upon secrecy inter se; it is quite another to suggest that there is some le-
gal right to force a judge to sign an order requiring that the parties "hush
up" on pain of contempt of court. 75
Some lawyers and judges resist the idea that a court should require
some showing of good cause for a protective order even if all parties have
agreed to it. An assumption built into the adversary system is that if the
73. See, e.g., D.N.J. LOCAL R. 5.3(b)(1) ("Notwithstanding this rule, parties may enter into written
agreements to keep materials produced in discovery confidential and to return or destroy such materials
as agreed by parties and as allowed by law.").
74. The trial judge in Frankl made this point nicely, emphasizing that litigants could bypass
procedures for obtaining protective orders by "entering into a stipulation of confidentiality, inter sese,
rather than seeking the Court's imprimatur of their arrangement." Estate of Frankl v. Goodyear Tire &
Rubber Co., 853 A.2d 880, 883 (N.J. 2004) (quoting trial court).
75. Anderson, supra note 6, at 727.
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adversary parties agree to something, then that issue no longer need be
decided by the court. 76 Thus, one recent article on protective orders ad-
vances the argument that a "joint stipulation of good cause is a showing of
good cause, and Rule 26 is satisfied."'77
The argument that parties are entitled to work out protective orders by
their own agreement may appear to be bolstered by Rule 26(c)'s conferral
requirement, but this is not a necessary conclusion. Like Rule 37 on mo-
tions to compel,78 Rule 26(c) requires that a motion for a protective order
be "accompanied by a certification that the movant has in good faith con-
ferred or attempted to confer with other affected parties in an effort to re-
solve the dispute without court action."' 79 The certification requirement
demonstrates a preference for parties to work out their discovery disputes
whenever possible without involving the court. 80 Most discovery disputes
involve either discoverability issues, such as relevance, privilege, work
product, and undue burden, or the adequacy of discovery responses. These
disputes may reach the court either by the seeking party's motion to compel
or by the responding party's motion for a protective order.81 In this light, it
makes sense that both Rule 37 and Rule 26(c) require parties to attempt to
work out their differences before turning to the court to resolve their dis-
covery dispute.
Orders concerning discovery confidentiality, however, present a dif-
ferent dynamic from disputes over discoverability or responsiveness. Dis-
covery confidentiality does not primarily pit one party against the other, but
rather pits the parties against a possible public interest in disclosure. The
party responding to discovery wishes to keep its information confidential;
the party seeking discovery wishes to obtain the information as readily as
possible for use in the litigation. 82 In any event, the requirement that parties
76. Thus, for example, allegations in a complaint that are admitted in the answer are no longer
contested issues in the action.
77. Pace, supra note 3, at 49.
78. FED. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(2)(B) ("The motion [to compel discovery responses] must include a
certification that the movant has in good faith conferred or attempted to confer with the person or party
failing to make the discovery in an effort to secure the information without court action.").
79. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c).
80. See supra text accompanying notes 46-48 on the extent of party control, rather than judicial
control, over discovery.
81. Rule 26(c) empowers courts to enter a wide variety of protective orders, including orders
limiting the scope of discovery or forbidding certain discovery. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(1)-(8).
82. The judge, too, has an interest in ordering confidentiality to satisfy the parties, to facilitate the
conclusion of the litigation, and to reduce the number of discovery disputes litigated by the parties. In
his article defending the District of South Carolina's anti-secrecy rule, Chief Judge Anderson writes of
"the human dynamic that comes into play when judges are presented with consent secrecy orders."
Anderson, supra note 6, at 727. Writing mostly about secret settlements, but also about discovery, he
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confer before seeking a protective order is not inconsistent with the court's
obligation to reject a protective order-stipulated or not-absent a showing
of good cause. 83
CONCLUSION
Modem United States discovery, in both global and historical perspec-
tive, far exceeds the evidence-gathering power litigants have had in other
places and times. Such broad power to extract information is justifiable as a
means to gather information needed for adjudication, not as an all-purpose
public information tool. The discovery rules do not purport to establish a
broad information-gathering power divorced from particular litigated dis-
putes.
Thus, the burden for obtaining an order protecting the confidentiality
of unfiled discovery materials should be relatively light. Parties generally
should be able to obtain such orders as long as the parties can articulate a
legitimate need for confidentiality. The standard should not be so strict as
to require, as some cases have held, both specificity and a showing of seri-
ous injury. Confidentiality orders should be rejected or modified if a risk to
public safety, the need for information in related cases, or some other pub-
lic interest outweighs the need for confidentiality. In many cases, however,
protective orders for discovery confidentiality should be easily obtained.
The light standard for obtaining such orders, however, is nonetheless
greater than zero. Thus, even for stipulated protective orders, courts should
require a showing of good cause. The parties' say-so alone, without some
showing of a need for confidentiality, does not constitute good cause for
the granting of a protective order. Requiring a showing of good cause, be-
yond the parties' stipulation, accomplishes three things. First, it creates a
stop-and-think opportunity for the lawyers to decide whether they really
need the order, and for the court to consider whether any public interest is
at stake that should be weighed against the need for confidentiality. Sec-
ond, it offers at least some protection against unjustified reliance on protec-
tive orders that are subsequently challenged. Third, it prevents parties from
explains that "judges face incredible pressure to go along with court-ordered secrecy in the heat of
battle." Id. at 729.
83. See 2 DISCOVERY PROCEEDINGS IN FEDERAL COURT, supra note 18, § 20.02, at 9-10.
Although district courts are usually eager to ratify the parties' stipulated agreements, courts
may refuse to ratify a stipulated protective order.... [T]he district court must make an inde-
pendent determination that good cause for the protective order exists before it can agree to the
stipulation and must reject a stipulated protective order if it finds that there is no good cause
for the order.
Id. (citing Jepson v. Makita Elec. Works Ltd., 30 F.3d 854, 858 (7th Cir. 1994)).
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obtaining the court's imprimatur solely by private agreement, in a context
where the interests of the adversaries are pitted not primarily against each
other, but against a possible public interest in disclosure.
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